Earlier, we have proposed a logic, called priority logic 16, 18] , where a theory consists of a collection of logic programming-like inference rules (without default negation) and a priority constraint among them. We showed that nonmonotonic reasoning in general can be viewed as a reasoning based on selecting monotonic inferences that satisfy the speci ed priority constraints.
Introduction
In the past, nonmonotonic reasoning has mainly been studied in formalisms where default assumptions constitute a necessary component, e.g. defaults in default logic, negation-as-failure in logic programming, disbeliefs in various nonmonotonic modal logics and assumptions in some abductive and argumentation frameworks.
In classic logic, reasoning is based on monotonic inferences. Such a sequence of inferences can be viewed as an argument that supports one's assertion. The notion of constrained monotonic inferences is about selecting some of these monotonic inferences according to a speci ed constraint. As an example, consider the bird-y example: Birds normally y unless it can be shown otherwise. Suppose we know that dead birds don't y, neither do hungry birds. The problem can be represented as a positive program with priority constraint (for simplicity, we remove the condition bird):
1: fly 2: :fly dead bird 3: :fly hungry bird with priority 1 2 and 1 3, meaning when either 2 or 3 is applied, the application of 1 should be blocked. Now, assume we know that the bird is dead:
4: dead bird
Consider the two monotonic derivations, I 1 = f1g which concludes fly, and I 2 = f4; 2g which concludes :fly. The speci ed priority selects I 2 , because rule 2 being applicable blocks the application of rule 1. Earlier, we have formulated this idea into a logic, called priority logic, and shown in 18] that Reiter's default logic and Horty's defeasible inheritance networks 9] can be expressed in priority logic. This second result seems particularly interesting since it presents a partial answer to Horty's challenge that it is impossible to relate path-based reasoning to general nonmonotonic formalisms. In addition, we demonstrated that variations of the existing semantics of default logic may be studied through priority logic. Further in 16] , we showed that parallel and prioritized circumscription of existential quanti er-free formulas can be represented in priority logic.
Priority logic o ers a number of advantages over the conventional formalisms relying on default assumptions. Chief among these is a language construct by which one can express, directly, that some evidence is stronger than others directly. For example, one may express that the evidence that Quakers are paci sts is stronger than the evidence that Republicans are not, and thus to avoid contradiction by speci cation. This feature seems to be particularly important in legal reasoning, since the coordination of con icting pro les of legal relevance is often accomplished by establishing preference relations among assertions and arguments.
The goal of this paper is to investigate how some of the logic program semantics can be expressed in priority logic. An important implication of this study is that once negation-as-failure can be represented in priortity logic, we get a formalism that supports both default negation and priority, since the former can be \compiled" into the latter. In other words, in this formalism, default negation comes \free".
The central technique used here is based on a translation of a logic program to a priority program. Then the relationship is established between the semantics of a logic program and the semantics of its translated priority program.
For normal programs, it is well known that the well-founded model, and stable and regular models are least and maximal xpoints of a monotonic operator 21]. In 17], similar semantics are de ned for priority logic programs, and their relations with the semantics of normal programs eatablished.
The main interest of this paper lies in disjunctive programs. We show in Section 3 that the stable semantics can be expressed as selecting monotonic inferences. The main result of this paper is a new, credulous semantics discoved during this study. This semantics extends the stable semantics for disjunctive programs in the same way as the regular semantics 20] extends the stable semantics for normal programs. It also has a natural interpretation of abduction. This result can be seen as an extension of Dung's early work 4] where he shows how restricted classes of disjunctive programs can be understood in terms of abduction in the sense of Eshghi Each inference scheme represents a set of inference rules, where the free variables in the scheme have been instantiated by terms from the underlying domain, in this case, H. Generally we use a label with variables to name a rule scheme. The variables in a label are the free variables appearing in the scheme. For example, we use l(x; y) to label the rule scheme q(x) p(x; y).
Like a scheme, a label with variables represents all the instantiated labels.
A priority theory (or, called a priority logic program) is a couple hR; i where R is a set of inference schemes and is a relation on R.
In the sequel, we often only mention inference rules and ground priorities. In such cases, it is assumed that rule schemes and priorities are already instantiated.
For an inference rule r = 1 ; :::; m , Pre(r) refers to f 1 ; :::; m g and Cons(r) to . Intuitively, a priority constrains whether a rule can be applied or not: if l l 0 and l 0 is applied, then the inference rule l should be suspended.
In priority logic, we place no restriction on a priority constraint. Properties like transitivity may be speci ed by the user, depending on the intended applications.
Let`be an inference relation, P be a set of inference rules, and S a set of formulas. The familiar consequence operator T P is de ned as:
T P (S) = fCons(r) : r 2 P; S`Pre(r)g If`is monotonic, then T P is also monotonic. In this case, it has a unique least xpoint, which is denoted here by T "! P . The applicable rules in a rule set P, denoted App(P), is de ned as: App(P) = fr 2 P : T "! P`P re(r)g.
In the sequel, if not said otherwise,`is taken as the standard rst order derivation relation.
Arguments as semantics
A primary interest in a priority logic program lies in what can be derived by using which inference rules. A derivation is just a chain of reasoning using inference rules. At a level of conceptualization, this can be understood as a notion of argument which serve as an important building block in reasoning with priority.
De nition 2.1 (Argument on hP; i) Let hP; i be a priority logic program. An argument is a ( nite or innite) set of inference rules in P such that I's rules can be arranged into a sequence, say I = fw 1 ; :::; w n ; :::g, such that for every w i 2 I, where i 0, we have T "! fw 1 ;:::;w i?1 g`P re(w i ).
That is, an argument is just a sequence of rules, each of which is applicable by the rules prior to it. The set notation used in the de nition is for convenience.
Given a priority logic program hR; i, we are interested in those arguments that agree with the speci ed constraint . The construction of such an argument involves how to extend an argument I by possibly admitting mroe rules into it.
Since when we specify r r 0 , we mean the applicability of r 0 blocks that of r, a natural notion of extending an argument I is: I admits a rule r (i.e. r extends I) if there is no other rule r 0 in I that blocks r.
For example, consider the example bird fly ostrich don 0 t: 1 : fly bird 2 : :fly ostrich 3 : bird^ostrich where 1 2. Let I = f3; 2g. Thus, 1 cannot extend I.
Since the notion of priority may have di erent interpretations, in general one can take the approach that the semantics of a priority logic program depends on a parameter R, which is a mapping over arguments. We call such a mapping an extensibility function. We now de ne the most intuitive extensibility function discussed above.
De nition 2.2 Let hR; i be a priority logic program, I be an argument, r be a rule in R. We de ne an extensibility function R 1 as follows: R 1 (I) = App(fr : 8r 0 2 I; r 6 r 0 g):
Note that, since each rule in an argument must be applicable in the argument itself, the employment of App is technical and ensures that the resulting set of rules is an argument.
De nition 2.3 Given an extensibility function R, an argument I is said to be self-extensible under R if I R(I).
Not all arguments are self-extensible. E.g. with P = hf1 : a g; f1 1gi under R 1 , clearly f1g is not self-extensible, since R 1 (f1g) = ;.
The approach based on extensibility function is su ciently exible to allow various application-dependent extensions and modi cations. For example, one can strengthen the notion of extensibility by insisting on consistent extension: given an argument I and rule r, r extends I if there is no r 0 2 I such that r r 0 and if I implies the precondition of r then r's conclusion must not contradict I. This extensibility function can be used to express Horty's defeasible inheritance networks 9]. The details can be found in 18].
>From now on, we will say \a priority logic program hP; i with R (or under R)", to re ect the fact that the rst step in choosing a semantics is to specify how to extend an argument. However, since the technical results of this paper only depend on R 1 given above, the reader can always safely assume R 1 in place of a general extensibility function R.
De nition 2.4 (Stable argument)
Let hP; i be a priority logic program with extensibility function R. An argument I is said to be a stable argument if R(I) = I.
A stable argument I is just a xpoint of extending I. That is, the rules in I are precisely those applicable rules that are not blocked by rules in it, no more, no less. This priority logic program has one and only one consistent stable argument I such that any two cities A and B are connected if and only if it is known they are connected. Obviously, this is a simple application of the closed world assumption of Reiter 12] .
A stable argument is a total argument. E.g. suppose I is a stable argument under R 1 . Then, by de nition any rule r in I extends I (selfextensible) and for any rule r 6 2 I, if r's precondition can be concluded from I, then there is some rule r in I such that r 0 r. Because of this totality, a priority logic program may not have a stable argument. For example, P = hf1 : a ; 2 : b g; f1 1gi has no stable argument under R 1 .
To resolve this problem, we propose partial semantics, i.e., the kind of semantics that are de ned for all programs and give information on the portion of the program that \make sense", For example, for the program P above, since 2 is irrelevant to the con icting information, the argument f2g should be accepted. Such a semantics depends on the properties of extensibility functions R. De nition 2.5 Let hP; i be a priority logic program with extensibility function R. R is monotonic i for any arguments I 1 and I 2 , I 1 I 2 implies R(I 1 ) R(I 2 ). R is anti-monotonic i for any arguments I 1 and I 2 , I 1 I 2 implies R(I 2 ) R(I 1 ).
If R is not monotonic, then there is no guarantee that a stable argument exists. However, if R is anti-monotonic then R 2 , the operator that applies R twice, is monotonic. It thus has a least xpoint and possibly other xpoints.
It can be checked easily that R 1 de ned earlier is anti-monotonic. De nition 2.6 Let P = hR; i with a monotonic or anti-monotonic extensibility function R. A xpoint I of R 2 is called an alternating argument of P if it is a xpoint of R 2 . It is said to be normal under R if I R(I). 1 By de nition, any normal alternating argument must be self-extensible, and a stable argument must be also a normal alternating argument. Hence the least normal alternating argument is exactly the intersection of all the normal alternating arguments, and thus serves as a kind of skeptical semantics. On the other hand, the maximal normal alternating arguments serve as a kind of credulous semantics.
We call the least normal alternating argument the well-founded argument, and maximal normal alternating arguments regular arguments. Example 2.2 Consider P = hf1 : a ; 2 : b ; 3 : c g; f1 2; 2 1gi under R 1 . P has a well-founded argument f3g and two regular arguments f1; 3g and f2; 3g, both of which are also stable.
The importance of the the well-founded semantics of a priority logic program lies in its tractability. Since it is the least xpoint of a monotonic operator which can be computed iteratively from the empty argument, the semantics is tractable as far as the underlying monotonic function can be tractably computed.
The relationship between semantics of priority logic programming and normal logic programming is given earlier in 17].
Theorem 2.1 Let P a normal program. There exists a polynomial time transformation from P to a priority program P such that the well-founded model of P corresponds to the well-founded argument of P and regular models 2 of P correspond to regular arguments of P . 1 The notion of alternating xpoint was introduced by Van Gelder 7] and later studied by a number of authors. We denote by AS L the set of all assumptions in the underlying language L.
We may use A B; not C to denote a clause where A is the set of atoms in the head, B the set of atoms in the body, and not C the set of the assumptions in the body. Conveniently, if C is a set of atoms, not C also denotes the set of assumptions not for each 2 C, and conversely, if not C is a set of assumptions C denotes the set of atoms appearing in these assumptions.
A stable model M of a disjunctive program P is a set of atoms, which is a minimal model of the following transformed program: P M = fA B : A B; not C 2 P; and 8(not ) 2 not C; 6 2 Mg
To express the stable semantics of a disjunctive program P in priority logic, we translate P into a priority logic program.
First, we need some notations. Let Q be a set of atoms. We will denote by :Q the set of negative literals : , for each 2 Q. When There is an interesting implication of representing a semantics in priority logic; namely, priority logic can be seen as a formal system that supports both default assumptions and priorities over positive rules, since the former can be \compiled" into the latter. For example, suppose during the construction of a knowledge base, one has already written the following disjunctive program 1: drive j take bus 2: drive not car broken 3: take bus not good weather where j is the connective of epistemic disjunction. This is an incomplete speci cation as both drive and take bus are in the same answer set. To say that driving takes higher priority, one can specify that the second rule blocks the third by a priority constraint 3 2. 3 4 Partial Stable Semantics for Disjunctive Programs
Why another semantics?
There are several reasons why the semantics to be proposed is interesting and important. First, it is well-known that a drawback of the stable semantics is that a disjunctive program may not have a stable model. Dung 5] uses the barber's paradox to illustrate this drawback for the case of normal program. Here we extend it to a disjunctive program. There are other application domains in which the static semantics is not applicable. For example, in planning and scheduling, in general we are interested in any plan that achieves the goal, and any schedule that satis es the speci ed constraints. This is a form of credulous reasoning.
In the case of normal programs, the drawback of the stable semantics mentioned above can be resolved by a weaker notion of a stable model, called regular This inference rule is similar to resolution. Intuitively, it says that if we assume not we can make it stronger in an attempt to derive additional, tentative information. Since not is weaker than : , we do not want to treat not and as logical contradiction. This is prevented by the requirement n > 1.
In the rest of this section, by a derivation, we mean the standard rst order derivation relation augmented by the above rule of inference. We will denote this derivation relation by`d . Note that this relation will be used, implicitly, in the construction of an argument. Now program transformation should be modi ed accordingly to t this rule of inference. Let us denote by not Q the set of atoms not for each not 2 not Q.
De nition 4.1 (Transformation p partial (P))
The (partial stable) transformation of a disjunctive program P is a priority program p stable (P) = hR; i, where R = fH _ not C j A B; not C 2 P; H _ = A :Bg
We are now ready to de ne the partial stable semantics based on the notion of partial stable assumption set.
De nition 4.2 Let P be a disjunctive program. Let p stable (P) be its (partial stable) transformation and I a regular argument of p stable (P). Then, S is a partial stable assumption set i the following holds: not 2 S i l not 2 I.
Since a stable argument is also a regular argument, and thus a stable model corresponds to a partial stable assumption set, the partial stable semantics extends stable semantics in the same way as the regular semantics extends stable semantics for normal programs. Apparently by de nition, the partial stable semantics for disjunctive programs reduces to the regular semantics for normal programs. The following result shows that this semantics satis es a desirable property; namely, each true atom derived by a program along with any of its partial stable assumption set is \founded". The proof is straightforward.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose P is a disjunctive program. Let be an atom, S a partial stable assumption set, and P S`d . Then there exists a clause A B; not C in P such that 2 A, not C S, P S`d B, and for each in, either not 2 S or P S`d .
Abductive reasoning with partial stable semantics
There is a natural notion of abduction associated with the proposed semantics. The key lies again in the use of the derivation relation augmented by RTAC.
In general, an abductive framework be a triple h ; Ab; ICi where P is a rst order theory, Ab is the set of abducibles, and IC is set of rst order formulas serving as integrety constraints.
We restrict to a special class of abductive frameworks that correspond to disjunctive logic programming. Namely, we let be a disjunctive program, Ab be the set of assumptions, and IC = f? ( 1 _ ::: _ n ); not 1 ; :::; not n j n 1g
Let be an atom. We say that a set E of abducibles is where denotes explicitly negated atom . That is, is viewed as an atom to start with, and its intended meaning is de ned by integrey constraints. Then, an abductive semantics for extended disjunctive programs can be de ned as by those partial stable assumption sets S, for which we have P S IC 6`d ?.
Related Work and Final Remark
The concept of logic programming without default negation was rst suggested in 10] and further developed in 3]. The authors argue that a knowledge representation language without using default negation can avoid the possible confusions arising from the use of default and explicit negation. Priority in this framework however relies on the existence of contradiction. The e ect of its interaction with contradiction is usually hard to predicate. As a result, the semantics of a program under this notion of priority may not be intuitive to what is intended. This treatment of priority also complicates the relation between programs with default negation (normal programs) and those without. This is because the transformation from the former to the latter has to resort to contradiction in order to have a one-one correspondence (cf. 19] for more details). Recently, Sakama and Inoue proposed prioritized logic programming, where priority is among literals and assumptions, not among rules 14]. Priority here is used to reduce the number of answer sets in disjunctive logic programming, while our notion of priority can remove answers from an answer set.
Brewka recently proposes dynamic priority where a priority predicate is used in program rules just like any other predicate, and preferences are determined dynamically 2]. Extension of priority logic with dynamic priority constraint presents an interesting but challenging future research topic.
Work is also under way to show that Eshghi-Kowalski's abductive procedure, augmented by standard resolution procedure, can be used to answer queries for disjunctive programs under the partial stable semantics. One notes that partial deduction as given in 15] is in fact a form of resolution. Thus, a disjunctive program can be rst partially evaluated so that clauses with head-cycles are no longer needed. Then, for head-cyclic free programs, the program obatined by an operation called shifting 4] can be used by Eshghi-Kowalski's procedure to show that an atom is true w.r.t. one partial stable assumption set. Or alternatively, Eshghi-Kowalski's procedure can be augmented by resolution dynamically.
Aravindan Although the semantic is exactly the same that of (E)GCWA and its procedural interpretation based on the notion of support-for-negation, this study present a close relationship between abduction and negation. As we can see, the idea behind this framework is not new but still minimal model reasoning and hence can be expressed by our regular augment as follows: Let 
